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SUBCHAPTER C OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
II. CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS
There would be much more to say on the subject of
corporate liquidations had the House Bill rather than the
Senate version been enacted. What began as a fundamental
revision giving some evidence of consistency in theory,
albeit defectively executed in some of its details, ended up
in the familiar terms of the old law, with legislative clarifi-
cation confined to a few areas, such as collapsible corpora-
tions, the Kimbell-Diamond' situation, Court Holding Com-
pany,2 and the definition of partial liquidation. As a quick
reading of the Treasury's proposed regulations will dis-
close, the "clarification" that was attempted may be il-
lusory, since the legislative answers are not conceptual
but ad hoc. Many new problems are generated and the
old ones, though the frequency of their recurrence may
have been reduced, remain.
The general rule as to liquidating transactions has uni-
formly been that the entire amount received by the share-
holders represents the proceeds of a sale or exchange of
their stock. This has not always guaranteed taxation of
liquidating gains at capital gains rates, however. Under
the Revenue Act of 1921' as interpreted by the Treasury,
such gains, to the extent they wete ". . . paid out of earn-
ings or profits of the corporation accumulated since Feb-
ruary 28, 1913," were taxed as dividends." This approach
I Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd,
187 F2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 '(1951).
2 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
3 Revenue Act of 1921, § 201, 42 STAT. 228-9 (1921).
4 U.S. Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1545 (1922).
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was quickly repudiated by the Revenue Act of 1924,' but
in 19348 the still more drastic technique of treating all
liquidating gains as short-term capital gains was adopted.
In the field of complete liquidations this lasted only until
the Revenue Act of 1936;' but, because of the supposed
inadequacy of old Section 115(g) 8 to catch cases of dis-
guised dividends cast in the form of stock redemptions, it
was continued as to partial liquidations until the Revenue
Act of 1942.' In the intervening period, the definition of
complete liquidations was restricted to those completed
within two years°--increased to three years by the Rev-
enue Act of 1938." It will be observed that the variations
which have been described all went to the treatment of
gain after its computation in the usual way; none of them
attacked the sale or exchange principle itself. Even under
the 1921 Act dividend treatment was limited to the gain
as compared with taxing the full amount of the earnings
and profits as a dividend and computing a sales gain or
loss by reference to the remainder of the distribution.
Moreover, there was never any departure from the gen-
eral rule in the case of losses.
Various exceptions to this broad approach of treating
liquidations as closed transactions equivalent to a sale
by the shareholder of his stock in a fully taxable form
were developed over the years. One was to permit tax-
free liquidation of subsidiaries.' Another was an in-and-
out provision, designed primarily for the liquidation of
5 Revenue Act of 1924, § 201(c), 43 STAT. 255 (1924).
6 Revenue Act of 1934, § 115(c), 48 STAT. 711 (1934).
7 Revenue Act of 1936, § 115 (c), 49 STAT. 1687-8 (1936).
S Throughout the remainder of the article, references to sections by
number are to the INNAL REVENUE CODE of 1954 unless otherwise specif-
ically stated in the text or indicated by footnote.
9 Revenue Act of 1942, § 147, 56 STAT. 841 (1942), amending Section
115 (c) of the INT. REV. CODE of 1939, 53 STAT. 46-7 (1939).
10 Revenue Act of 1936, § 15 (c), 49 STAT. 1687-8 (1936).
32 Revenue Act of 1938, § 115 (c), 52 STAT. 496-7 (1938).
12 INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 112 (b) (6), 53 STAT. 38 (1939).
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holding companies, which postponed the recognition of so
much of a qualified shareholder's liquidation gain as was
represented by unrealized appreciation in corporate as-
sets distributed in kind.'" A third was the section dealing
with so-called collapsible corporations, which were being
used by individuals in an effort to pervert the liquidation
rules into a device for converting ordinary income into
capital gain.'4 In addition, several areas of uncertainty
had grown up leading to unnecessary litigation and con-
troversy, for which legislative clarification was imperative
in the interests of facilitating legitimate business transac-
tions. These dealt primarily with various methods and
techniques of accomplishing the sale of a business without
either incurring double taxation, once at the corporate
and once at the shareholder level, or depriving the pur-
chaser of a basis equivalent to the price paid for the
business.
What the House Bill proposed in this field, though it
fell by the wayside, is of interest not only historically but
as an example of what an attempt at correlation might
produce.' At the heart of the House scheme lay the pol-
icy determination that a tax was not to be imposed until
there had been an economic realization of gain, meaning
that shareholders would not be taxed at the time of
liquidation upon unrealized appreciation in corporate as-
sets. This was accomplished by specifying that taxable
gain could result from a liquidation only if both the basis
and the fair market value of the distributed assets ex-
ceeded the shareholder's stock basis, in which case gain
was to be measured by the lower of the two. Where the
fair market value of the distributed assets was less than
the stock basis, loss was recognized regardless of asset
13 IwT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 112 (b) (7), 58 STAT. 40 (1944).
34 Irr. REV. CODE of 1939, § 117 (m), 64 STAT. 934 (1950).
'5 The House Bill provisions dealing with corporate liquidations were
Sections 331 through 336; H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 77-81 (1954).
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basis. Where asset value was in excess of, but asset basis
was less than, stock basis, neither gain nor loss resulted,
but the shareholder thereafter carried the assets at his old
stock basis. In the other cases, the post-liqidation basis
of the distributed assets was, of course, the figure at which
they had been taken into account in computing gain or
loss. These rules were applicable whether the liquidation
was intercorporate or involved non-corporate share-
holders, except that gain to corporate shareholders was
treated as a dividend, with complete tax exemption ac-
corded in parent-subsidiary cases by a raising of the
dividends received deduction from 85 to 100 percent.
At this point another policy decision cut across the Bill.
Under the general rule, if appreciated assets were dis-
tributed in kind and the basis of such assets exceeded the
stock basis attributable thereto, the asset basis would be
preserved and the appreciation would be subject to tax
when subsequently realized-either directly, upon a sale
or exchange, or indirectly, through reduced depreciation
deductions. Where the asset basis was less than the ap-
plicable stock basis, however, there would be a step-up,
and the difference between stock basis and asset basis
would never be subjected to tax or, if in effect previously
taxed on a recent sale of the stock, would have been taxed
-at capital gains rates. This was deemed undesirable
where the assets were depreciable assets or would have
been productive of ordinary income at the corporate
level. It was therefore provided in such cases that no
gain or loss would be recognized on the portion of the
liquidating distribution consisting of such assets (called
"appreciated inventory"), the applicable stock basis
would be eliminated (for purposes of determining gain or
loss and resulting basis on the rest of the distribution),
and the assets would be taken over at a carryover basis,
retaining also their particular character, e.g., inventory,
Section 1231 assets, etc. It will be seen that under this
19551
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rule the amount of the shareholder's allocated stock basis,
to the extent it exceeded asset basis and did not exceed
asset value, was lost, for only asset basis was preserved
and loss was allowed only in the amount, if any, by which
allocated stock basis exceeded asset value.
Corresponding rules designed to produce the same re-
sult where the liquidating corporation sold its assets and
distributed the proceeds were also provided. Where the
assets disposed of did not consist of appreciated inventory
gain was not taxed to the corporation, but was attributed
to the shareholder. He was permitted to add such gain
to his stock basis for purposes of computing liquidation
gain or loss, however, thereby obtaining a net result
equivalent to a liquidation in kind followed by a sale by
the shareholder. Where the assets in question were ap-
preciated inventory, on the other hand, gain was recog-
nized to the corporation and, if distribution of the pro-
ceeds produced a second gain to the shareholder, that was
also taxed. In this latter respect there was a difference
between the rules governing a liquidation in kind followed
by sale and those applicable to a sale followed by a dis-
tribution of the proceeds, for in the first situation there
was a substitution of the potential gain at the corporate
level for the investment gain of the shareholder while in
the second case both would be taxed. In drawing this
comparison we are speaking of those cases where there
had been no change in stockholdings between the time the
appreciation in inventory values took place and the date
of liquidation. Where stock was sold and the appreciation
in inventory values formed part of the selling share-
holder's gain there would be two taxes in the liquidation-
in-kind cases as well. Whether these cases of duplication
were an imperfection or a necessary consequence of avoid-
ing hopeless complication need not be discussed.
To complete the description of the House liquidation
rules it should also be said that they operated against the
[VOL _3=
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background of a definition of complete and partial liquida-
tions which was considerably narrower than under the
1939 Code or the 1954 Code as finally enacted. The defi-
nition of partial liquidations has already been described.
In the definition of complete liquidations the three-year
time limit found in earlier revenue acts was restored,
though accompanied by a discretionary authority in the
Secretary or his delegate to extend it. Even so the cor-
poration must not be engaged in the active conduct of a
trade or business after such three-year period. Both par-
tial and complete liquidations were required to be pur-
suant to a plan, which could take the form of:'
*. . a resolution adopted by the shareholders or the
board of directors under which the termination of the
business or businesses and the transfer of assets in
redemption of all or part of the stock is authorized,
whether or not -
(1) a time for completion of the transfer is specified
in the resolution; or
(2) the distribution is considered a liquidation within
the meaning of the corporate law under which the dis-
tribution is made.
Where the transaction did not meet these various tests,
the distributions were relegated to the rules covering non-
liquidating distributions generally, discussed in the ear-
lier portion of this article.
The Senate Bill, which in substance became the final
enactment, abandoned this attempt at correlation and
returned to the special-provision treatment of liquidations
found in prior law, adding several new ones. In the first
place, the general rule was reinstated that shareholder
gain or loss on liquidation would be computed by taking
into account distributions in kind at fair market value
rather than on the principle of recognizing economic loss
but not taxing gain attributable to unrealized apprecia-
36 House Bill Section 336 (c); H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1954).
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tion in value of corporate assets.7 Along with this gen-
eral rule the two narrowly confined exceptions found in
prior law were likewise reenacted, with slight modifica-
tions. One deals with the tax-free liquidation of corpora-
tions with little or no accumulated earnings and profits,
the other with tax-free liquidations of subsidiaries.
The first of these special provisions appears as Section
333. In prior law it had been a temporary provision en-
acted on three separate occasions for limited periods of
time. It first appeared as Section 112 (b) (7) of the Rev-
enue Act of 1938 and was confined to liquidations taking
place in December, 1938.8 Next, Section 120 of the Rev-
enue Act of 1943"s placed it in the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939, but limited it to liquidations occurring in some
one calendar month in the year 1944. Finally, it was re-
stored by Section 206 of the Revenue Act of 195020 to
cover single-calendar-month liquidations in 1951 and ex-
tended by Section 316 of the Revenue Act of 1951,21 and
Section 101 of The Technical Changes Act of 1953' to
similar liquidations in 1952 and 1953. Section 333 is a
permanent provision. The only other change from prior
law is the exclusion of collapsible corporations.'
The classic case for which this provision was designed
is that of a holding company with property that has great-
ly appreciated in value since its organization. Its purpose
is to facilitate the elimination of such a holding company
without prohibitive tax consequences to the shareholders.
17 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 331, 68A STAT. 101 (1954).
18 Liquidation in a single month is necessary in order to avoid the com-
plication of having more than one taxable year involved. The month of
December was chosen in the original enactment as being the only month
that was certain to be governed by the Revenue Act of 1938, § 112(b) (7),
52 STAT. (1938).
19 Revenue Act of 1943, § 120, 58 STAT. 40 (1944).
20 Revenue Act of 1950, § 206, 64 STAT. 931 (1950).
21 Revenue Act of 1951, § 316, 65 STAT. 493 (1951).
22 Technical Changes Act of 1953, § 101, 67 STAT. 615 (1953).
23 The exclusion is in terms of "a collapsible corporation to which sec-
[Vol. XXX
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Suppose, for example, that property with a basis of
$100,000 and a fair market value roughly equivalent was
transferred many years ago by A, an individual, to his
wholly-owned X Corporation. There have been little or
no earnings since organization and what little there were
have been distributed as dividends in order to avoid the
confiscatory personal holding company tax. A would like
to get rid of his holding company in order to eliminate the
corporate tax, but the value of the property has risen in
the meantime to $1,000,000. A taxable liquidation (A's
stock basis being $100,000, the same as that of the prop-
erty originally transferred) would be productive of a
$900,000 gain, on which the capital -gain tax would be
$225,000-a higher price than A is willing to pay, since
he does not wish .to sell the property when he receives it.
Section 333 would permit him to liquidate the X Corpora-
tion tax-free. He will apply his stock basis, i.e., $100,000,
to the property, thereby deferring the taxable realization
of his potential gain until he actually disposes of it.
Section 333 is very technical. It divides the share-
holders of the liquidating corporation into three classes,
viz., corporate shareholders owning 50 percent or more
of its voting stock, corporate shareholders owning less
than 50 percent of its voting stock, and non-corporate
shareholders. The Section is not available to the first
class at all; it is available to the other two classes on an
elective basis. Within each class the particular share-
tion 341 (a) applies." Passing the point that Section 341 (a) is never applic-
able to .the corporation, but rather to its shareholders, a corporation can ap-
parently be a collapsible corporation by definition under Section 341(b), but
if Section 341(a) is not applicable to any shareholder because of the limita-
tions of Section 341(d), its liquidating distribution may still be eligible for
Section 333 treatment. In this respect, Section 333 is different from Section
337, where the corresponding exclusion of collapsible corporations is in def-
initional terms. Perhaps this difference is appropriate, since Section 333 is
a shareholder provision and Section 337 applies to the liquidating corpora-
tion itself. On the other hand, the exclusion of collapsible corporations from
Section 333 is not applied on a shareholder-by-shareholder basis, but by
characterization of the liquidating corporation itself in such a way that one
shareholder can presumably make the entire liquidation ineligible.
19551
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holder must himself make the election and a like election
must be made by other shareholders owning 80 percent
of the voting power of the stock owned by such class. The
elections must be filed with the Commissioner within 30
days after adoption of the plan of liquidation. If these
conditions are complied with and the liquidation takes
place in one calendar month, gain will be recognized only
to the extent of the greater of the particular electing
shareholder's ratable share of the corporation's accumu-
lated earnings and profits or the cash plus the fair market
value of certain cash equivalents received by him. If the
shareholder is a corporation, this recognized gain will be
taxed in the usual manner. If he is a non-corporate share-
holder, that portion of the recognized gain which is
measured by earnings and profits will be taxed as a divi-
dend and the remainder as a capital gain, short-term or
long-term, as the case may be.
Section 332, the other tax-free liquidation provision, is
a reenactment of Section 112(b) (6) of prior law. First
appearing in the Revenue Act of 19354 partly as an aux-
iliary provision to the Death Sentence Act' for public
utility holding company groups, partly to implement the
general governmental policy of corporate simplification,
and partly for the technical purpose of supplying a tax-
free exchange provision for mergers taking the form of
liquidations, it provided for non-recognition of gain to
parent corporations in intercorporate liquidations of sub-
sidiaries which were at least 80 percent owned. Gain was
recognized only to the extent of the money received, loss
was not recognized in any case, and the parent took over
the subsidiary's properties at the basis formerly applica-
ble to the stock, with adjustments for the recognized gain,
if any, and for the money received. The Section was ap-
plicable only to taxable years beginning after December
2A Revenue Act of 1935, § 110, 49 STAT. 1020-21 (1935).
25 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 803 (1935).
[Vol. XXX
CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS
31, 1935, and, before it became effective, two changes
were made by the Revenue Act of 1936. The first was
to make such liquidations completely tax-free to the
parent, whether or not money was received. The second
was to provide that the subsidiary's basis in the assets
should carry over to the parent rather than be replaced
by the parent's stock basis.26 Actually these changes were
really only one, that with reference to basis, for the com-
plete exemption of the parent's gain necessarily followed
that decision as a matter of course. The fundamental
question was which potential gain would be forgiven, the
parent's or the subsidiary's. In the 1935 Act it was the
subsidiary's, in the 1936 Act the parent's. What moti-
vated the change must remain a matter for speculation,
since the Revenue Act of 1936 is defective in legislative
history, having been written largely in conference and
there being no House lanagers' statement. Allegedly the
use of a carryover basis was administratively simpler,
since it avoided the problems of valuation involved both
in arriving at a partial recognition of gain and in allocat-
ing stock basis. There are cynics who also suggest that
at the time the basis of assets in the hands of subsidiaries
was higher than stock basis in the hands of parents.
Since 1936, therefore, the general rule has been that
neither gain nor loss would be recognized upon the liqui-
dation of an 80%-owned subsidiary, but the assets would
be taken over at the subsidiary's basis, thus presei-ving
the subsidiary's position in the hands of the parent for
future tax purposes. Several problems have arisen in the
course of time, however. One involves the situation
where the parent occupies the dual role of shareholder
and creditor. Let us assume first that the value of the
26 An election to have the 1935 Act basis provisions apply was granted
to taxpayers who had acted in reliance on the 1935 Act and completed their
liquidations prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1936. Section
113 (a) (15) of the Revenue Act of 1936, as amended by Section 808 of the
Revenue Act of 1938.
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subsidiary's assets received by the parent is less than the
amount of its creditor interest. Is a bad debt deduction
allowable, or is the parent's creditor interest merged with
its shareholder interest so as to bring the rule as to non-
recognition of loss into play? It was early held that the
interests were separate and that the bad debt was allow-
able.2' What then of the stock loss? It was held that,
assuming worthlessness did not take place in a prior year,
that loss was allowable as well, since the non-recognition
provisions applied only where something was received on
the stock, which would not be the case where the prop-
erty was insufficient to satisfy the subsidiary's debts.2
Another variation was where the assets were sufficient to
provide for some distribution on the stock, but the par-
ent's basis on its creditor interest was less than face. The
logic of the prior decisions led the courts to carry the
separability argument to the point of recognizing a tax-
able gain to the parent on its creditor interest though it
may have had an economic loss on the whole transaction
which it would never recoup.2 On these points the 1954
Code leaves the law as it found it, though the House Bill,
with its treatment of securities as stock in parent-subsid-
iary cases and its allowance of losses, would have worked
some differences. Only one consequence of the distribu-
tion of assets partly in payment of indebtedness has been
avoided. While a corporation realizes no gain or loss on a
liquidating distribution in kind, it is nevertheless true
that, where assets are used to discharge indebtedness, the
equivalent of a sale has taken place and gain or loss is
recognized."0 Of course, if everything goes to the parent
and there is no identification of what was used to pay off
27 Glenmore Distilleries Co., Inc., 47 B.T-.A 213, (1942), acq., 1942-2 Cum
BULL. 8.
28 Ibid.
29 Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.
1949).
30 LT. 4109, 1952-2 Cum BuLL. 138.
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its creditor interest, a technical application of this rule
would require that every asset be valued, with a propor-
tionate realization across the board. But since it is the
subsidiary's gain or loss that we are talking about and
since it is the subsidiary's position that is being preserved
under the basic liquidation rules of Section 332, it would
be simpler and more equitable to permit this gain or loss
to be postponed with the rest. Under the old law the Com-
missioner attempted to achieve this result by agreement."'
Under the 1954 Code it is written into the statute.
The big difference32 between the old law and the new
in the case of parent-subsidiary liquidations is the incor-
poration of the so-called Kimbell-Diamond rule. The
problem represented by this case arose out of the neces-
sity, where one corporation desired to purchase all the
assets of another, of acquiring such assets indirectly, i.e.,
by purchasing the stock and then causing the corporation
to be liquidated. This route was forced on purchasers by
the desire of the sellers to avoid the double tax that would
result from selling the assets and a liquidation out of the
proceeds, one tax on the corporation and one on its share-
holders. The difficulty with accommodating the sellers in
this fashion was that a literal application of the liquida-
tion provisions of the statute would saddle the purchas-
ing corporation with the acquired corporation's asset
basis, even though such basis bore no relation to the
31 Rev. Rul. 259, 1953-2 Cum. BuLL. 55, modifying I.T. 4109, supra.
32 One technical change not discussed in the text deserves to be
mentioned. The old law contained a restriction that the parent must not
have held a greater percentage of the subsidiary's stock at any time after
the adoption of the plan than it has when the property is received. This has
been eliminated "... with the view to limiting the elective features of the
section." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1954). There is some
question whether the purpose of the original limitation was fully appre-
ciated, because of the defective nature of the legislative history of the
1936 Act, already referred to in the text. It was to prevent a parent corpora-
tion which had room to spare on the 80% requirement and which
held the subsidiary's stock at varying bases, on some of which it would
realize a loss, from selling its loss stock, or some of it, and confining non-
recognition as far as possible to its gain stock.
1955]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
purchasing corporation's investment. This could, of
course, cut both ways. Where asset basis was lower than
the purchasing corporation's investment, it was the tax-
payer which argued for ignoring the intervening steps and
treating the transaction as a purchase of assets; when
asset basis was higher, it was the Government. The de-
cision which gave its name to the principle that the tech-
nicalities of the statute would be overridden and that the
purchase-of-assets theory was the correct one was in a
case won by the Government,"3 i.e., one where the effect
was to prevent a tax advantage through the purchase of
high-basis assets at a low cost. Although taxpayers also
won their cases, the Government continued to treat the
problem as one of preventing tax avoidance and to litigate
Kimbell-Diamond in reverse-cases where the basis of
assets would be stepped up, rather than stepped down, by
an application of that decision. Thus, the stage was set
for legislative clarification.
The legislative clarification took the form of providing
that, if at least 80 percent of the acquired corporation's
stock is "purchased" within a 12-month period and if the
corporation is liquidated within two years thereafter, the
basis of the assets received should not be the transferor's
basis, but the price paid for the stock. The term "pur-
chase" is defined to include any acquisition other than one
at a carryover basis, or by inheritance from a decedent, or
in a tax-free transaction under Section 351, or from a re-
lated taxpayer under the constructive ownership rules of
Section 318. An interesting point under this definition is
the status of an acquisition pursuant to a Kimbell-Dia-
mond liquidation itself. Suppose, for example, that the X
Corporation owns all the stock of the Y Corporation and
all the stock of the X Corporation is purchased by the Z
33 Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950),
aff'd 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,.342 U.S. 827 (1951).
(Vol. XXX
CORPORATE LIQUIDATIONS
Corporation for cash. The X Corporation is immediately
liquidated, whereupon the Z Corporation acquires all the
stock of the Y Corporation, which is liquidated in turn.
Will Z hold the Y assets at the price paid for the X stock?
This should be the result, and would certainly be if X
liquidated Y before Z liquidated X. It would also follow,
if the third alternative for acquiring a business (yet to be
discussed)-direct rather than indirect purchase of its
asse~ts - were employed. In the assumed case it depends
upon whether Z acquired the Y stock by purchase. The
only thing that could conceivably stand in the way of
this is that the stock was acquired from a controlled sub-
sidiary, X, which might be regarded as bringing the
transaction within the last exception noted above. But
this would be a perversion of the whole concept of Section
334(b) (2), which is that what really happens in a Kim-
bell-Diamond type of case is a purchase of assets (X's in
the first instance, consisting of the Y stock).
The statement, that in a so-called Kimbell-Diamond
liquidation the assets are taken over at the basis of (that
is, the price paid for) the stock, requires some elabora-
tion. In the first place, the stock-basis rule applies only
to the assets, or part thereof, attributable to the stock.
The portion of the assets distributed to the parent as
creditor is therefore governed by a different, rule, fair
market value at time of distribution. In the second place,
stock basis must be adjusted upward by the amount of
liabilities assumed on liquidation or subject to which the
property is taken over. Because of the possible time lag
between acquisition of the stock and liquidation, it is also
necessary to take into account intervening earnings or
losses. In other words, stock basis must be increased by
earnings and decreased by losses (and distributions) be-
tween the date the stock was acquired and the date the
liquidation takes place. For this purpose the earnings
and losses will not be the same as for income tax pur-
1955]
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poses, but must be refigured on a basis consistent with
the price paid for the stock, i.e., depreciation, gain or loss
on sale, etc., must be calculated in the light of the acquir-
ing corporation's investment, just, as though liquidation
had taken place immediately and the intervening opera-
tions had been conducted by the acquiring corporation
directly.
At first blush it may seem that Sections 332 and 334
(b) (2) are defective in not having extended the asset-
purchase theory to the acquiring corporation acting in its
capacity as creditor as well as shareholder. If, in order
to acquire all the assets of a particular corporation, anoth-
er corporation buys up all its outstanding stock and debt,
dissolving it immediately thereafter, ought there not be
non-recognition of gain or loss to the acquiring corpora-
tion and a taking over of the assets at the price paid for
the stock and debt? This is not the rule. There is gain or
loss to the parent on the satisfaction of its creditor interest,
if it acquired the debt at a discount or a premium, and an
increase or decrease in the aggregate basis of the total
assets by the same amount. These appear to be unneces-
sary complications. Yet there would have been complica-
tions the other way as well. It might have been necessary
to have treated debt and stock alike for purposes of the
80 percent and 12-month limitations. Certainly the neces-
sity of making intervening adjustments for a period longer
than the two-year maximum waiting period found in the
present statute would have had to be avoided at all costs.
This brings us to the question of whether the statutory
enactment of an automatic Kimbell-Diamond rule is ex-
clusive, or whether intent-to-purchase cases may still be
held to be within Kimbell-Diamond even though they fail
to qualify under Section 334(b) (2). The answer to this
question may depend upon who, the Government or the
taxpayer, is seeking such a result. Presumably it is up to
the taxpayer to comply with Section 334(b) (2) if he
[Vol. XXX
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wishes a stepped-up basis. This may well be true even
though it may be practically impossible to comply. Where,
on the other hand, the taxpayer deliberately fouls up
the transaction so as to avoid the application of Section
334 (b) (2) and thereby obtain a tax advantage, the courts
might preserve the step-transaction approach of the Kim-
bell-Diamond case to defeat what, on the facts of the
particular case, might appear to be an unconscionable re-
sult. It is possible, however, that reliance might have to
be put on Section 269 to defeat such tax-avoidance schemes
as the attempted use of Section 334(b) (1) to acquire
high-basis assets at a low cost. The problem of the dis-
tinction between Section 334(b) (1) and Section 334(b)
(2) cases also exists under the spelled-out carryover rules
of Section 381.
As already indicated, the technique of acquiring the
assets of an incorporated business by buying stock and
then liquidating arose out of the desire to avoid the
double tax that would result from a direct sale of the
assets followed by distribution of the proceeds in liquida-
tion. Even if the assets were first distributed in liquidation
and then sold by the shareholders, there was danger that
the sale would be imputed to the corporation. Such had
been the result in Commissioner v. Court Holding Com-
pany,34 and, while United States v. Cumberland Public
Service Company35 had gone the other way, the line of
distinction was so fine as to cause sellers to insist upon
placing the risk of failure upon the buyer. This buyer's
risk has now been eliminated by Section 334 (b) (2), but
another provision of the new Code also eliminates the
seller's risk, thus making it much more unlikely that
purchases and sales of the assets of an incorporated
business will be cast in the artificial form which will bring
Section 334(b) (2) into operation. At least, tax motives,
34 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
35 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
19551
NOTRE DAME LAWYERV
so far as the sellers are concerned, need no longer be
controlling but the choice of route will be largely the
buyer's and will depend on purely practical considerations
such as ease of transfer, preservation of rights, etc., plus,
in some instances, indecision as to what he wishes to do
with the acquired corporation when he obtains it.
The provision of the new Code which accomplishes this
is Section 337. Generally speaking, it provides that, when
a corporation goes into complete liquidation, it can sell
its assets without recognition of gain or loss. Thus, if the
X Corporation wishes to purchase all the assets of the Y
Corporation, all the Y Corporation has to do is adopt a
plan of complete liquidation, sell its assets to the X Cor-
poration, and distribute the proceeds. There will be no
tax to the Y Corporation; the only tax will be that of Y's
shareholders on their liquidation gain.
In order for Section 337 to operate, the liquidation must
be completed within 12 months after the adoption of
the plan, except for the retention of assets to. meet claims.
It is also provided that non-recognition treatment is ac-
corded only to those sales or exchanges which are effected
within the same 12-month period. Therefore, if assets are
retained to meet claims and are disposed of after the
close of the 12-month period, gain or loss will be recog-
nized as to them. Moreover, gain on the disposition of
instalment obligations attributable to transactions prior
to the adoption of the plan of liquidation will be recog-
nized in any case, as will gain or loss on the sale of stock
in trade, inventory, or property held for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of trade or business, and instalment
obligations resulting therefrom, unless and to the extent
substantially all such property attributable to a particu-
lar trade or business is sold to one person in one trans-
action. Finally, Section 337 is not applicable to the liquida-
tion of a collapsible corporation, or to a liquidation to
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which Section 33336 applies, or to a liquidation covered
by Section 332. In the case of a Section 332 liquidation to
which the legislatively enacted Kimbel-Diamond rule is
applicable, however, the gain which is unforgiven is
limited to that measured by the purchaser's rather than
the liquidating corporation's cost, thus insuring substan-
tially the same result as though the corporation had been
liquidated in kind immediately upon its acquisition and
the sales had been made by the acquiring corporation.
This particularization, has produced some problems. No
sooner was the Section on the books than it became evi-
dent that the 12-month limitation contained possibilities
of manipulation. Could a corporation which had both
loss assets and gain assets sell its loss assets before adop-
tion of a plan of liquidation and its gain assets thereafter,
so as to have the benefit of the losses but avoid the burden
of the gains? For all that appeared on the face of the
statute it could. Yet one could not blame the Commissioner
if he sought to prevent it, however valid the argument
that this was merely part of the price for the certainty
the Section was designed to achieve. But how could it be
accomplished? The proposed regulations adopt the tech-
nique of a latitudinarian approach to the question of when
a plan of liquidation is to be regarded as adopted. It is
stated that: 37
the date of adoption of the plan of complete
liquidation of a corporation is the date on which occurs
the first step in the execution of such plan, but not later
than the date of the adoption of the resolution by the
shareholders authorizing the distribution of the corporate
assets in redemption of all of the stock pursuant to which
the corporation is liquidated. In determining such date,
consideration will be given to the dates of any sales of
property... not ordinarily made in the conduct of the
36 Presumably, this means to which Section 333 is applicable to any
extent. Section 333 is a shareholder provision, effective on an elective basis,
and may be applicable to some and not to others.
37 Proposed regulations under subchapter C, § 1.337-2(b).
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business as well as to all other relevant facts and cir-
cumstances.
If the only effect of this were to catch pre-plan sales at a
loss in the non-recognition net, it might be relatively un-
objectionable, though it would still be a strained construc-
tion at odds with the general purpose of the Section, but
its effect is also to throw the duration of the entire 12-
month period into doubt. Whether some compromise is
possible is doubtful. If the provision is retained in the
final regulations, the Commissioner will be well advised
to confine its attempted application to cases of obvious
manipulation.
Another curious situation, though here the Commis-
sioner's proposed solution seems unexceptionable, arises
out of the way the inapplicability of Section 337 to col-
lapsible corporations is phrased. Section 337 (c) (1) merely
says that the section shall not apply to any sale or ex-
change:
... made by a collapsible corporation (as defined in
section 341 (b)).
Since the recognition at the corporate level of a substantial
part of the potential gain of the liquidating corporation
will prevent it from being classified as a collapsible cor-
poration, it is obvious that, superficially at least, a renvoi
problem is presented.' The proposed regulations take the
sensible view that what is meant is a corporation which,
but for the sales in question and had it liquidated in kind,
would have been a collapsible corporation. So much for
the question of statutory construction. The Commissioner's
position does nt necessarily mean a double tax, only that
a different method from Section 337 must be used to avoid
it. One is privileged to speculate, purely on the level of
theory, regarding the reason for the exception in the first
place. By treating the sales as taxable, the corporation is
38 Id. at § 1.337-1(a).
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made non-collapsible, which in some cases could mean a
lower total tax to the corporation and shareholders to-
gether than collapsible treatment to the shareholders
would produce. This aspect is probably academic, how-
ever, since it is unlikely that any collapsible or potentially
collapsible corporation would fail to wait out the three-
year holding period before liquidating. The practical con-
sequences of the exclusion seem therefore to be confined
to cases where, though the liquidating corporation is a col-
lapsible corporation by definition, the ordinary-income
consequences to the shareholders will be prevented by
the specific limitations of Section 341 (d). The sharehold-
ers' problem is thef simply one of avoiding double taxa-
tion. Under these circumstances, the effect of making
Section 337 inapplicable to sales by the corporation seems
to be to force the proposed disposition into the Cumber-
land or the Kimbell-Diamond mold. Exactly what is ac-
complished by this, except a feeling of visceral satisfaction?
One of the basic inconsistencies of subchapter C is the
limitation of Section 337 to complete liquidations. As-
suming the validity of the whole partial liquidation struc-
tare, there is no conceptual reason why a partial liquida-
tion should stand on any different footing from a com-
plete liquidation, at least where it takes the form of wind-
ing up a separate, as opposed to contraction of a single,
business. Failure to acknowledge this gives the appearance
of doubt as to the soundness of the underlying funda-
mental position of the statute. It is especially difficult to
comprehend, when it is remembered that the principal ef-
fect of making Section 337 inapplicable to partial liquida-
tions is merely to inconvenience, not to prevent. The as-
sets can still be distributed in kind without tax to the
distributing corporation. The shareholders can then sell
them, and only one tax will result. Possibly even a stock
sale followed by redemption in kind could be worked.
Within the scope of the general statutory scheme, there-
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fore, the limited coverage of Section 337 suggests a lack
of courage in someone's convietions. As will subsequently
appear, Section 337 is not the only instance of this.
Another is the timidity evidenced by Section 355 on the
subject of the sale of spun-off stock. Oddly enough, Sec-
tion 337 is even subtly inconsistent within itself, in that,
while partial liquidations are ruled out, the separate-
business approach is adopted in connection with bulk
sales of inventory. But perhaps we ought not to leave this
subject without permitting the other side to say, in the
words of Mr. Justice Holmes, that the life of the law has
been experience, not logic. 9
We come now to the one remaining liquidation problem
of great importance - that of the so-called collapsible
corporation. It may best be presented by way of example.
Suppose a group of motion picture actors, actresses, a di-
rector or two, and a producer, feeling themselves ag-
grieved at the small amount of their earnings they can
keep after taxes, cast about for ways of converting their
ordinary income into capital gains. They hit upon the
device of setting up a single-picture corporation, put in
a very small amount of capital themselves, and persuade
an established motion picture company to finance it by
way of loans. They make the picture, contributing their
services either free or at nominal compensation. Upon
its completion, they liquidate the corporation, paying a
capital gains tax on the excess of fair market value over
cost, and then sell the picture to the sponsoring estab-
lished company or, holding it themselves, amortize it on
a stepped-up basis. Or suppose a real estate developer
who, in order to avoid paying tax at normal and surtax
rates upon the profits of his venture, incorporates it,
liquidates the corporation upon completion of the project,
takes over the property with a stepped-up basis at the
relatively low cost of a tax at capital gains rates, and then
39 Homm, TBE CommoN LAw 1 (1881).
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markets the houses with little or no further gain. Ob-
viously the corporate set-up in these cases is a sham. The
.corporation was never intended to do business in any
real sense4 ' and perhaps an effort ought to have been made
to ignore it under the principles of Gregor/y v. Helvering.4'
There was an unexplained reluctance to rely on such a
method of attack, however, and, instead, legislation was
sought to remedy the situation, with all the danger of pro-
viding a blue-print for tax avoidance that a spelled-out
approach to problems of this kind creates.
To meet the particular type of abuse which has been
outlined above, Congress, in 1950,42 enacted Section 117
(m) of the 1939 Code. This Section provided that gain,
including liquidation gains, on the sale or exchange of
stock of a "collapsible corporation" should be treated as
ordinary income rather than capital gain. Collapsible cor-
porations were defined as corporations formed or availed
of for the manufacture, construction, or production of
property with a view to a realization (which must also
have been actually effected) of the resulting gain by the
shareholders through a sale or liquidation of their stock
interest prior to any substantial realization of such gain
by the corporation. Suitable provision was also made to
prevent circumvention by means of an intervening holding
company. Several limitations were placed upon the ap-
plication of the Section. Only shareholders owning 10 per-
cent or more of the corporation's stock were affected.
Moreover, ordinary-income treatment was applied only
40 It is interesting to observe, in this connection, the language of the
proposed regulations under subchapter C dealing with active conduct of a
trade or business for purposes of Section 355. Section 1.355-1(c) of such
proposed regulations reads in part as follows: ". . . a trade or business
consists of a specific existing group of activities being carried on by a
corporation or individual for the purpose of earning income or profit from
only those specific activities. Such group of activities ordinarily must in-
clude the collection of income and the payment of expenses."
41 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
42 Revenue Act of 1950, § 212, 64 STAT. 934 (1950).
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to gain realized within three years of the completion of
the manufacture, construction, or production in question.
Finally, more than 70 percent of the shareholder's gain
had to be attributable to the proscribed source. Only one
subsequent amendment was made to this Section prior
to the 1954 Code. Section 326 of the Revenue Act of 1951'
added to manufacture, construction, or production the
purchase of property which was stock in trade, or prop-
erly includible in inventory, or held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of trade or business.
The new Code (Section 341) makes four further
changes. One of them is purely clarifying and makes cer-
tain that capital distributions in excess of basis, unac-
companied by any stock redemption, are within the scope
of the Section. Another reduces from 10 to 5 the permitted
percentage of stock ownership before the Section comes
into operation. The other two are of greater importance.
The first of these sets up a class of assets known as "Sec-
tion 341 assets" and includes therein, in addition to the
type of property formerly listed under the purchase clause
(referred to generally as inventory property), depreciable
and real property used in the trade or business other than
that used in connection with the manufacture, construc-
tion, production, or sale of inventory property and un-
realized receivables or fees except receivables attributable
to the sale of non-Section 341 assets. The inclusion of de-
preciable and real property used in the trade or business
is presumably designed to reach purchased rental prop-
erties, such as apartment houses, for the purpose of pre-
venting the creation of a stepped-up basis for depreciation
through liquidation at capital gains rates. In accomplish-
ing this, the Section may go too far, for it will subject to
ordinary income treatment the type of gain which, on a
direct sale, would be capital gain. Where a true sale is
being effected, rather than a mere transfer without any
43 Revenue Act of 1951, § 326, 65 STAT. 502 (1951).
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change in beneficial ownership, this ought perhaps to be
avoided. At the same time, the difficulties of drawing such
fine lines of distinction and the possibilities of manipula-
tion that may be created thereby go far to justify the
draftsman's failure to discriminate, especially in view of
the liberal supply of safety valves to be found in the Section
as a whole.
The last change made by the 1954 Code in the collapsible
area is the creation of a rebuttable presumption of col-
lapsibility if at the time of the shareholder's realization of
gain the value of the corporation's Section 341 assets con-
Istitutes more than 50 percent of the value of its total
assets other than cash, obligations which are capital assets,
certain discount obligations, and stock and if such value
is 120 percent or more of the collective adjusted basis of
such assets.
On the whole the section has been strengthened, but
there are still some opportunities for escape through the
use of non-taxable exchanges. One of these loopholes,
liquidation under old Section 112 (b) (7), has been closed
by excluding collapsible corporations from Section 333,
the corresponding provision of the new Code. Other tax-
free exchanges, whereby the shareholders can convert
stock in their collapsible corporation into stock of a non-
collapsible corporation, which can then be sold at capital
gains rates, are nevertheless still possible, though the con-
sideration in such cases will no doubt be discounted be-
cause of the burdens of a carryover basis which will be ii-
herited by the new owner."
C. Rudolf Peterson*
44 The third part of Mr. Peterson's article on Subchapter C of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is scheduled to appear in the August, 1955
issue of the Lawyer.
*Practicing Attorney; partner in the firm of Lee, Toomey & Kent, Washing-
ton, D.C.
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